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Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has renewed the interest in executives’ compensation-related 
horizon incentives. This paper examines how the short-termism in CEO compensation affects 
corporate cash payout through share repurchases using a new measure of compensation horizon 
incentive.  In contrast to the conventional wisdom that firms buy back shares after poor stock 
performance, we find that CEOs with short compensation horizons are more likely to buy back 
shares after good performance. To bolster already high stock price, they have incentives to 
repurchase to boost up reported EPS towards analysts’ expectations, and to cater to investors 
with short investment horizons. This short-termism is not related to corporate governance, but 
is more severe in firms that have less liquid stocks. While long-term shareholders do not benefit 
from such repurchases, short-termist CEOs benefit by selling their own holdings when firms are 
buying. Our findings suggest that some large cash payouts by firms with short managerial 
horizons during the repurchase binge in 2005-2008 may be premature, which portraits a striking 
contrast from the liquidity constraints that many firms experienced later during the crisis.    
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1. Introduction 
      The recent financial crisis has reinforced the interest in managerial horizon incentives. Pay 
arrangements that rewarded Wall Street bankers for short-term gains even when these gains were 
subsequently reversed gave many bankers strong incentive to “hit it big with one great year and then 
retire rich”. This type of compensation structure has received wide criticism. Tying pay to long-term 
performance has been at the top of the regulator’s reform agenda. More generally, all these highlight the 
importance of managerial horizon incentive on corporate decision making. Existing theories suggest that 
managers with short horizon incentive may involve in decisions that yield short-term gain at the expense 
of long-term firm value (e.g., Narayanan, 1985 and 1996; Stein, 1989; Thakor, 1990; Bebchuk and Stole, 
1993). In this paper, we add to the literature by conducting an empirical test on how managerial horizon 
incentives arising from executive compensation structure may affect corporate decisions and firm value, 
in the context of corporate cash payout through share repurchases.   
      Cash payout in corporate liquidity management during the pre-crisis stock market boom provides an 
opportune setting in examining this issue. In light of the adverse and widespread impact of the recent 
financial crisis on corporate sectors, how firms manage internal and external sources of liquidity to 
weather negative financing shocks has attracted increasingly more attention.1  Some latest studies have 
shown that corporate investment decline following the onset of the crisis, especially for firms that have 
low cash reserves (e.g., Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy, 2010; Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010). High 
pre-crisis cash reserves mitigated the adverse effect on post-crisis investment of the external financing 
supply shock.  
      On the other hand, S&P1500 non-financial firms distributed cash, typically through share repurchases, 
at an unprecedented level during the last market boom 2003-2007 before the crisis. The “buyback binge” 
(as the financial media then put it) portraits a striking contrast from the liquidity constraints that many 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (forthcoming) for how firms managed credit lines 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.  
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firms experienced later during the crisis.2 Moreover, in contrast with the conventional wisdom that firms 
typically repurchase undervalued stocks, many firms bought back shares after good stock performance.3 It 
is unclear why firms are buying back such a large volume of shares when the shares are not so cheap. Are 
these repurchases short-sighted and therefore do not benefit shareholders in the long run? How does the 
repurchase decision relate to managerial horizon incentives?  
      We hypothesize that managers with short-term horizon incentives tend to rely more on share 
repurchases to bolster already high stock price in a short run, and thus have more incentives to repurchase 
after good performance (managerial horizon incentive hypothesis). These repurchases, less likely to be 
motivated by undervaluation, are more likely to be undertaken to manage reported earnings-per-share 
(EPS) towards analysts’ forecast consensus, or to cater to the demand of investors with short investment 
horizon for better short-run performance. Although those firms may be met with favorable market 
reaction in the short run, long-term shareholders would not benefit as much as from repurchases 
motivated out of the undervaluation concern.   
      We test an alternative hypothesis that managers may be overconfident and thus believe their equity is 
undervalued despite the current good performance (managerial overconfidence hypothesis). We 
distinguish the two hypotheses by looking at managers’ own trading of the firms’ stock when these firms 
are buying back their shares. Note that we focus on cash payout through repurchases but not dividends. 
This is because dividends are rather smooth over time, and the stickiness of dividends does not give 
managers as much leeway as repurchases in terms of the timing and magnitude of payout. Repurchases 
also have advantages that dividends do not have in facilitating EPS management and providing liquidity 
                                                           
2 In examining the share repurchase activities in the banking industry, Banyi, Porter, and Williams (2010) find that 
banks that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) returned a higher proportion of their 
available capital to shareholders in the periods leading up to the financial crisis than banks that did not.  
3
 A recent study by Fu, Huang, and Lin (2011) finds that the open market repurchase anomalies, as reported by 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), disappeared for the period of 2003-2010 for all repurchasing firms 
covered in Compustat. This finding suggests that firms in that period on average might not buy back shares that 
were as undervalued as in earlier periods shown in Peyer and Vermaelen (2009). 
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and price floor support when investors and managers themselves are selling their holdings, both of which 
are related with managers’ horizon incentives.   
      We measure the managerial horizon incentive induced by equity compensation using the idea of pay 
duration developed in Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2010) and Cadman and Sunder (2010). 
This new measure is computed as the weighted average of the vesting periods of different pay 
components (salary, bonus, restricted stock and stock option). It thus explicitly captures the horizon 
incentives in the pay contract: the shorter the pay duration is, the shorter horizon incentive has a manager. 
As discussed in Gopalan et al. (2010), this measure has a number of advantages over some other 
compensation-related measures used in the prior literature to understand the extent to which 
compensation structure provides horizontal incentives to executives. 
      Using a sample of S&P 1500 non-financial firms which have equity components in CEO 
compensation from 2005 to 2008, we find strong empirical support for the managerial horizon incentive 
hypothesis.4  More specifically, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that firms tend to buy back shares 
when they are undervalued, we find that CEOs with shorter pay duration are more likely to repurchase 
(and repurchase more) shares after good stock performance. However, the more these firms spend on their 
own shares at a high price, the more shares are sold contemporaneously by their CEOs themselves. This 
finding holds after controlling for CEOs’ diversification and portfolio rebalancing incentives. It is not 
supportive of the managerial overconfidence hypothesis, which suggests CEOs in these firms will 
increase or hold (at least not sell) their own holdings.  Instead, although we do not argue that repurchases 
at a high price serve the sole purpose to bolster stock price for self-interested CEOs’ own trading needs, 
such repurchases have provided liquidity and price floor support to the CEOs’ net selling. Consistent with 
this view, we show that the effect of CEO pay duration on repurchases after good performance is much 
stronger in firms with less liquid stocks traded. This is because, ceteris paribus, the positive (negative) 
                                                           
4 The data on the vesting schedules of restricted stocks and stock options are only available from 2005.  
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price impact of firm buybacks (CEO net selling) should be greater in these firms as opposed to in firms 
with highly liquid stocks. 
      We also examine how external market force and internal governance may have contributed to the 
seemingly short-termism in large cash payouts. We study two types of market forces: high expectations 
from analysts and short-term performance pressure from investors. We find that the incentive to 
repurchase after good performance appears to be stronger in the presence of these external forces. 
Specifically, the magnitudes of repurchases at high prices by CEOs with short pay durations increase 
when such repurchases boost up reported EPS towards analysts’ forecast consensus which otherwise 
would fall short of it, and when more institutional investors have short investment horizons.  On the other 
hand, we do not find evidence in support of the mis-governance view that short-termist CEOs are more 
likely to repurchase shares at high prices in poorly governed firms. 
      Next we ask how such repurchases affect firm value in the short and long run. These repurchases at 
high prices and their EPS inflation impact might meet the market’s preference in the short run, typically 
the preference of investors with short-term investment horizon. This might be especially the case if, for 
example, repurchases are announced after a string of consecutive earnings increases or when stock prices 
have been experiencing a rising trend. Repurchases under those circumstances fuel investor optimism or 
even the illusion that the firms are undervalued despite the high present prices. Alternatively, the 
repurchase decisions might signal managerial commitment to distribute cash regardless of the market 
timing.  All the above hypotheses suggest that such repurchases would benefit selling shareholders and 
other investors in the short run, but less likely those loyal (non-selling) investors in the long run. Our 
findings confirm this after examining the market reaction to the repurchases and tracking these firms for 
up to three years subsequently.  
      In sum, we find that CEOs with short pay horizon have more incentives to buy back shares after good 
stock performance. And they are more likely to do so to meet the market preference for better current 
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performance than their counterparts with longer horizon incentives. Those repurchases would benefit 
selling shareholders (and the CEOs if they sell) and other short-termist investors, but not those loyal long-
term investors. It is worth noting that our findings are robust even after controlling for CEO ownership, 
presumably another proxy for long-term incentives. And ownership itself does not seem to explain 
repurchases at high prices. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find 
that ownership by bank CEOs does not explain their risk-takings and firm value. It suggests that CEOs 
may face other high-powered incentives like short-term performance expectation and pressure from the 
market and short-term profits from selling their holdings.   
      We note the endogeneity concern that pay duration and repurchase decision might be co-determined. 
In selecting the optimal pay duration, shareholders will account for how share repurchases may affect 
managerial wealth through the structure of compensation scheme. To isolate causation, we utilize both 
GMM simultaneous equation estimation and firm fixed-effect regressions in our robustness checks. We 
find that, even after controlling for the effect of repurchase on pay duration, our main results hold that 
firms with short CEO pay duration are more likely to repurchase shares after good performance. In 
additional checks, we also show that our main results are robust after controlling for other potential 
motives of repurchase such as option dilution concerns documented in the previous literature.     
      The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline the share repurchase 
binge before the recent financial crisis, develop testable hypotheses, and delineate our contribution to the 
related literature. We introduce the data, variable construction and empirical specifications in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results. In Section 5, we address the endogeneity concern and 
conduct robustness checks. We conclude in Section 6.  
2. Hypotheses development and related literature 
2.1. Background and hypotheses development 
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      Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008) have documented the increase in share repurchase in 
a firm’s payout mix over time. More recently, firms seemed to have paid out through repurchases not only 
transient earnings windfalls as suggested by the earlier literature (e.g., Guay and Harford, 2000; 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000), but also permanent earnings (see a discussion in DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008)). 
      The unprecedented level of repurchases was featured in the financial media as “the buyback binge”. A 
news report cited some analyst’s comments as follows: “This trend raises questions about corporate 
executives’ priorities…… If they can’t find anything to do with their money, it makes wonder what these 
guys are doing. You would think if you’re that flush you would be pouring it into R&D and trying to 
come up with the next iPod.” (by Marc Hogan, Business Week, August 28, 2006). 5   Practitioners 
expressed their concern too, as exampled by a comment in Schwab On Investing of Winter 2009: 
“Investors once rewarded the stocks of firms that used cash to buy back shares rather than capital 
investments. We believe this performance pattern on longer holds, however, as investors perhaps now 
believe firms deploying capital in this way are being short-sighted.”   
      Viewed with hindsight, many firms bought back shares at much higher prices than prices obtained 
during and after the financial meltdown. Managers did not seem to have a rational expectation that large 
share repurchases at high prices may absorb the bulk of firm profits and leave firms snapped in tough time. 
Also cited in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2008), the “Heard on the Street” column commented: 
“Warren Buffet knows a value stock when he sees it. Other executives can struggle with the concept – 
particularly when it comes to their own company’s shares.” (by Liam Denning, The Wall Street Journal, 
October 6, 2008). However, even viewed ex ante, share prices of many of those firms were not cheap. 
Many firms repurchased after a string of quarterly earnings increases which led to higher stock prices. 
Moreover, the more recent surge in repurchases seem not to be explained by the use of stock options 
in executive and employee compensation and the resulted dilution offsetting motivation (e.g., Fenn and 
Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002; Bens, Nagar, Skinner, and Wong, 2003; Weisbenner, 2004; Babenko, 
                                                           
5 See also a report by Elizabeth MacDonald in Forbes on May 21, 2007.  
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2009). There is because there has been a decline in stock option grants in compensation since 2002 
(Walker, forthcoming).  
      We think that both the “signal-jamming” explanation in managerial horizon literature (e.g., Stein, 
1989) and the agency problem of overvalued equity hypothesis raised by Jensen (2005) are useful in 
understanding the above repurchase binge. Many firms experienced long strings of consecutive quarterly 
earnings increase during 2003-2006 which fueled market optimism, and these firms enjoyed high excess 
returns. These market premia and the rapidity with which they may disappear once the strings end provide 
managers incentives to maintain and extend the strings (Myers, Myers, and Skinner, 2006). The basic idea 
of “signal-jamming” is that higher earnings today will be correlated with higher earnings in the future, 
and the stock market uses the current earnings to make a forecast of firm value. Thus, managers may 
manipulate this signal by boosting up EPS through repurchases, typically when it becomes hard (or too 
costly) to improve on past good performance based on firm fundamentals. Jensen (2005) argues that when 
a firm’s stock price is at such a level that cannot be easily justified by performance, then actions (such as 
repurchases) will be taken that at least appear to generate the market’s expected performance in the short 
run. Both arguments suggest that this short-termism incentive is particularly stronger when managers’ 
equity incentives are more tied to the short-run stock performance.  
      Furthermore, stock liquidity will affect short-termist CEOs’ incentives to repurchase. Repurchases 
drive up stock prices in the short run, and the price impact of repurchases should be greater with less 
liquid stock, ceteris paribus. Therefore, short-termist CEOs who concern more about the short-run stock 
prices should have more incentives to buy back shares in firms with less liquid stocks. This generates our 
first testable hypothesis (managerial horizon incentive hypothesis):  
      Hypothesis 1: CEOs with short pay horizons have more incentives to buy back shares after good stock 
performance.  
      Hypothesis 1a: We expect that this relationship will be stronger in firms with less liquid stocks. 
      Alternatively, CEOs may be overconfident of the future firm performance and thus regard their firms’ 
equity undervalued despite the current high prices. This is possible particularly if their firms have 
9 
 
experienced an increase in performance for some time, e.g., a sequence of quarterly earnings increase 
during a market boom. In this case, these firms may buy back shares to signal their CEOs’ belief in the 
firms’ equity value.  Under this managerial overconfidence hypothesis, we would expect that CEOs will 
not sell their holdings when their firms are buying. Malmendier and Tate (2005) suggest that 
overconfident CEOs will even delay exercising their vested stock options.  
      But under the managerial horizon incentive hypothesis, CEOs care about the short-run stock prices 
because they can sell/exercise their vested stocks/options with more proceeds. Hall and Murphy (2002) 
suggest that underdiversified and risk-averse managers tend to cash out their stocks and options upon 
vesting. Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that open-market 
repurchases increase the market liquidity of repurchasing firms’ stock. Thus, firm repurchases provide 
liquidity and price support for CEO selling to some extent. Moreover, as discussed below, repurchases 
after a string of good performance may fuel investor optimism which will bolster stock prices at least for 
the short run. CEOs can benefit from such price increase if they sell their holdings when their firms are 
buying.  As such, we have the following two competing hypotheses: 
      Hypothesis 2a: CEOs with short horizon incentives are more likely to sell their holdings when firms 
are buying at high prices.  
      Hypothesis 2b: Short-termist CEOs who initiate repurchases at high prices are less likely to sell their 
own holdings. 
      Reflection of the recent financial crisis often points to the mis-governance in the failure to tying pay 
to long-term performance. The prior literature on corporate governance and firm cash policy also finds 
that weakly controlled managers dissipate cash quickly in ways that may destroy firm value (e.g., Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008). We hypothesize that poor corporate 
governance may have place less constraint on short-termist CEOs’ decisions to repurchase at high prices. 
Thus, we will test: 
      Hypothesis 3: CEOs with short horizon incentives are more likely to repurchase after good 
performance in firms with poor corporate governance (as opposed to in firms with good governance).  
10 
 
      Aside from internal governance, managerial horizon is often related with investor horizon. There is an 
extensive literature on how myopic stock market may cause or aggravate managerial myopia. For instance, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990) suggest that short horizons of smart investors lead to short horizons of 
managers. Short-termist investors tend to avoid investing in long-term assets that raise the cost of 
arbitrage because mispricing of claims to long-term assets can take a long time to disappear. As a result, 
mangers who are averse to the underpricing of their equity will avoid long-term projects. Brandenburger 
and Polak (1996) and Jensen (2005) suggest that short-termist managers tend to make decisions that the 
market wants to see. Polk and Sapienza (2009) and Asker, Ferra-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2011) find 
consistent evidence that managers might distort investments in catering to the market.  
      Gaspar, Massa, Matos, Patgiri, and Rehman (2004) show that managers tend to buy back shares 
instead of paying dividends in responding to the preferred payout policy by short-term oriented 
institutional investors. We expect that when investors and managers are aligned in horizon incentives and 
both have short horizons, managerial myopia can be more severe. Specifically, high investor pressure for 
near-term performance can incentivize CEOs with short horizon to more actively repurchase either to 
boost up current EPS or to bolster the stock prices temporarily.  This leads to: 
      Hypothesis 4: The relationship between CEOs’ short horizon incentives and repurchases after good 
performance is stronger when the market pressure for short-term performance is more pronounced. 
      Dissipating cash through repurchases without timing the market might signal managerial commitment 
to payout, and thus mitigate the agency problem of free cash flow. Also, such repurchases after good 
performance may fuel investor optimism, because they meet the expectation of the market for better 
performance if they increase the reported EPS, or “signal” that the firms remain undervalued despite the 
high current prices, even though the market will not be fooled in the long run.6  Either the payout 
                                                           
6 The prior literature suggests that, at repurchase announcements, the market does not seem to distinguish who will 
proceed, following repurchase announcements, with actual repurchases due to undervaluation from who will not 
(Lie, 2005). Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2008) find no difference in repurchase announcement returns between firms 
that repurchase shares and firms that do not repurchase shares during the quarter or the quarter following the 
repurchase announcement. 
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commitment or short-run investor optimism predicts a positive market reaction to the repurchase 
decisions and higher investor return at least for the short run.  
      The value implication of those repurchases for the long-run investors is less clear ex ante.  While 
investors are less concerned that managers may spend the free cash flow on value-destroying mergers and 
acquisitions or other negative NPV projects, surrendering the ability of timing the market in repurchasing 
shares may result in benefiting short-run investors at the expense of long-run investors. More importantly, 
managerial focus on short-run performance and the incentive to cater to the near-term market preference 
may otherwise distort the firms’ financing and investment decisions. Long-term projects may be left 
insufficiently funded due to the large payout. This resource misallocation overall may not benefit 
shareholders in the long run. Polk and Sapienza (2009) show that firms earn lower subsequent returns 
following investments made to cater to the current investor preference. We have the fifth testable 
hypothesis as follows: 
      Hypothesis 5: repurchases made by CEOs with short horizion incentives after good performance 
benefit short-run but not long-run shareholders.  
 
2.2. Related Literature 
      Our study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, we show empirically that managerial 
preference and horizon incentive affects corporate decisions and firm value. There has been a rich set of 
theories, discussed earlier, on this issue. The growing empirical research is often constrained by the 
difficulty in measuring horizon incentive and having a good proxy for it. We tackle this issue by using the 
notion of pay duration. Prior literature suggests that equity-based compensation, typically the proportion 
of non-cash pay, mitigates managerial myopia (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bizjak, Brickley, and 
Coles, 1993; Holmstrom and Tilore, 1993; Kole, 1997). Our study differs in that we consider the time 
restrictions on stock/option vesting, and thus treat the horizon incentives of any stock/option grants with 
the same dollar values but different vesting schedules differently. Consistent with the idea that pay 
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duration captures managerial horizon incentive, Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2010) find that 
managers with short pay duration are more likely to cut R&D and use more discretionary accruals. Other 
empirical studies suggest that managerial myopia may also arise from the threat of takeover (Stein, 1988), 
the influence of institutional investors (Bushee, 1998), or approaching retirement (Dechow and Sloan, 
1991; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Gao, 2010).  
      Second, our study is related to the vast literature on cash holding and payout policy (see a review by 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 2008). We document that many S&P 1500 firms distributed cash 
substantially by buying back their shares after good stock performance. Managers in these firms 
surrendered their market timing ability in share repurchases of earlier periods (e.g., Dann, 1981; 
Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995 and 2000; and Brockman and Chung, 
2001) as well as in security issuance (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; and Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner, 
2011). We show that these managers typically have short pay horizon incentives and place more weight 
on short-run performance. Although these repurchases benefit shareholders in the short run, they are not 
long-term value maximizing. In contrast, repurchases made by managers with longer horizon incentives 
create value beneficial to both short-term and long-term shareholders. In a similar vein, Massa, Rehman, 
and Vermaelen (2007) show that some repurchases are not motivated by taking advantage of a 
significantly undervalued stock price, but rather are chosen as a strategic reaction to other firms’ 
repurchase decisions.  
      Our findings have implication for firms’ cash holding policy and liquidity management in light of the 
fact that there is an overall increase in corporate cash holding. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) suggest that 
firms on average save more for precautionary motive as firms’ cash flows become riskier. Other studies 
suggest that agency problem of free cash flow should be taken seriously and corporate governance 
matters in firms’ cash management (e.g., Harford, 1999; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; 
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; and Harford, Mansi, and 
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Maxwell, 2008). We find that managerial horizon incentive, shown as being unrelated to corporate 
governance, can also affect how firms may make efficient use of their large cash holdings.  
      Third, we show some evidence of the impact of institutional shareholding on corporate payout policy. 
Specifically, we find that CEOs with short horizon incentives are even much less likely to time the market 
in their share repurchase decisions when there are more institutional investors with short investment 
horizon. Repurchases under this circumstance are more likely to be due to the pressure for short-term 
performance from short-term investors. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that payout policy affects 
institutional holding, but the relation does not hold in the other direction. Our finding differs possibly due 
to the following: 1) they look at an earlier sample period (up to 1996) when institutional ownership was 
not as prevalent as more recently; 2) unlike us, they focus on overall repurchases and do not distinguish 
those conducted with poor market timing from others.   
      Lastly, we add to the insider trading literature (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; and 
Fidrmuc, Goergen, and Renneboog, 2006) in identifying an inconsistence between their private trades and 
firm-wide decisions for short-termist CEOs. They sell their holdings when their firms are buying at high 
prices. Their private trades are consistent with the view that executives have contrarian views on firm 
value as suggested in Jenter (2005) which are beneficial to themselves, but not long-run (non-selling) 
shareholders. In contrast, we find long-horizon CEOs’ private trades are more consistent with their firm 
repurchase decisions. It highlights the importance of aligning managers’ incentives with those of long-run 
shareholders’, and also the potential cost to long-term investors of those firms which would prefer 
optimally a short executive pay duration as suggested by Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006). Indeed, 
Babenko, Tserlukevich, and Vedrashko (2009) show that the undervaluation signal of a repurchase may 
be more credible if executives buy the firm’s shares in their account too.  
3. Data and Variable Construction 
3.1.  Data and sample construction 
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      Our hypotheses relate CEOs’ horizon incentives to affect stock prices in the short and long run, which 
in turn impact their compensations and incomes through their stock trading, so we start with a sample of 
S&P 1500 index firms with equity components in their CEO compensations.7 The sizes and vesting 
schedules of restricted stocks and stock options granted to these CEOs for the period of 2005-2008 are 
from Equilar Consultants.8 We obtain data on other components of CEO compensation (salary and bonus) 
and equity ownership from ExecuComp, stock returns from CRSP, firm financial data from Compustat, 
institutional ownership from CDA/Spectrum, and analysts’ EPS forecasts from IBES. Firms in the 
financial sector (SIC 6000-6999) and utility sector (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded.9 Finally, we require 
share repurchase data, data on size and vesting schedule of stocks/options, stock returns and all 
explanatory accounting items available for each firm year during the sample period 2005-2008.  
3.2.  CEO horizon incentive measure 
      We measure CEOs’ horizon incentives induced by equity compensation using the idea of pay duration 
developed in Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2010) and Cadman and Sunder (2010). This new 
measure of the duration of executive pay is in a similar spirit to the duration measure developed for bonds, 
and shows the extent to which overall pay provides shor-term incentives to managers. For each CEO-year, 
it is calculated following Gopalan et al. (2010) as the weighted average of the lengths of the vesting 
periods (the time it takes before the grant is vested) of the different pay components, with the weight for 
each component being the fraction of that component in the CEO’s total compensation. Specifically,  
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7 For a study of how CEOs’ non-equity incentives may affect their share repurchase decisions, see Cheng, Harford, 
and Zhang (2010).   
8 We thank Radha Gopalan for making the data available to us.  
9 Our results are not affected qualitatively if we include them in the sample.  
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 are the dollar values of salary and bonus as of the year end, 
and thus have a vesting period of zero.  
 and 	
 are the dollar value of restricted stock grant 
si and stock option grant oi which will vest in  and  years, respectively. The value of restricted stock 
grant is estimated as the product of the stock price on the grant date and the number of stocks granted, 
while the value of stock option is estimated using Black-Scholes option pricing model. S and O, 
respectively, are the total number of stock and option grants in a year.  
      Prior literature has long argued that CEOs’ stock-based compensation can better align their incentives 
with long-term shareholders’ value than cash compensation (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bizjak, 
Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Holmstrom and Tilore, 1993; Kole, 1997).  But it treats the horizon incentives 
of any stock (and/or option) grants of equal dollar values equally without taking into account the length of 
the vesting schedules of the grants. Intuitively, for two stock (and/or option) grants with identical grant-
date dollar values, the grant with longer vesting periods will provide longer incentive horizons.  Thus the 
pay duration measure has the advantage of better capturing CEO’s horizon incentives than the 
conventional equity incentive measure.10 We show later that the relationship between pay duration and 
repurchase decisions remains robust after controlling for the proportion of equity pay in the total 
compensation. Gopalan et al. (2010) also discuss the advantages of this pay duration measure over some 
other compensation measures developed in the prior literature like the delta and vega of executive’s stock 
and option grants and holdings (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006) and the extent of correlation of 
executive pay to stock returns and accounting earnings (Sloan, 1993).  
3.3. Empirical specifications and key variables 
      We have three sets of tests in our empirical analysis. The first includes tests of Hypothesis 1, 3 and 4, 
which concerns how CEOs’ horizon incentives may impact their repurchase decisions after good stock 
performance, and how stock liquidity, corporate governance and market pressure may affect the relation 
                                                           
10 Using the examples of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brother, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) argue that 
equity-based compensation do not necessarily result in an alignment of executives’ interest with long-term 
shareholder value.   
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of CEO’s horizon incentives and repurchase decisions. We employ two models – Logit and Tobit – for 
these tests based on the following specification for Hypothesis 1: 
)*+,-./01*23  α  β 4,-0567823  β'9:.*11-*5-,823;  β<4,-0567823 = 9:.*11-*5,-823; 
 β
>
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and the following specification for Hypothesis 1a, 3, and 4: 
)*+,-./01*23 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 β
F
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where the subscript i indicates the firm and t time in years.  We employ two measures of repurchase: a 
dummy in the Logit model and the ratio of repurchase expense to the firm’s prior-year-end market value 
of equity. We follow the prior repurchase literature and measure a firm’s stock performance using its 
annual stock return over the fiscal year in excess of the contemporaneous market return (value-weighted 
CRSP stock return). Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) suggest that prior stock returns are the best predictor of 
future returns for repurchases. We also use other measures of benchmark return such as Fama-French 48 
industry return for robustness. The results are similar, so we choose not to report them for brevity. In our 
analysis, all explanatory variables in the interaction terms are demeaned to facilitate the interpretation of 
the estimated coefficients of the variables. Detailed variable definitions for all variables in the empirical 
analysis can be found in Appendix 1.  ?785-7@123;  refers to a set of firm characteristics variables the 
literature has identified that may affect a firm’s repurchase decision (e.g., Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan, 
Stephens, and Weisbach, 2000; and Huang and Thakor, 2011).  
      C0.57-23;  refers to the stock liquidity, corporate governance, and market pressure, respectively. We 
use two measures of stock liquidity: the bid-ask spread (Spread) and the average daily stock turnover 
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(Turnover). We include three commonly used measures of corporate governance: the Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) index (GIM-index), the number of directors in the board (Board size), and the collective 
equity ownership by all non-executive directors in the board (Non-exe director ownership).   
      We measure market pressure from two sources. The first is the pressure to meet or beat the consensus 
analyst forecast. Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that stock price drops significantly if a firm’s EPS 
misses its expectation by even a small amount. This pressure should be more pronounced after a string of 
good performance and investors’ expectation becomes higher during a market boom. Hribar, Jenkins, and 
Johnson (2006) suggest that not all repurchases will necessarily inflate EPS. So we construct an annual 
observation which is the proportion (or the number) of quarters within a year that repurchases actually 
inflate the reported EPS towards the analysts forecast consensus (Accretive repurchase). The second 
market pressure measure we use the proportion of institutional investors with short-investment horizon, 
controlling for institutional ownership in a firm-year (Short-term institutions). The institutional investor 
horizon is derived based on Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005).11  It is intuitive that the more institutional 
investors with short-term horizon, the higher pressure for short-term performance, because those investors 
may “vote with their feet” which creates stock price down pressure if firms cannot show satisfying 
performance in the short run. 
      Our second test is to examine how CEOs conduct their private trades of the firms’ shares when the 
firms are buying (Hypothesis 2). We conduct an OLS regression based on the following specification: 
?9IJ*5K,-./01*23
 α  β
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11 We thank Joe Zhang for the data on institutional investor horizon.  
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where the subscript i indicates the firm and t time in years. We define the dependent variable 
?9IJ*5K,-./01*23 as the dollar value of net open market purchases following Jenter (2005), which is 
calculated as the product of the net number of shares bought or sold during a year by the stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year. The number of shares bought or sold on the open market during a year is the annual 
change in stock holdings minus the number of shares acquired through option exercises and stock grants.  
      We also follow Jenter (2005) in including a number of controls to capture CEOs’ diversification and 
portfolio rebalancing incentives in their private trades. The dollar value of restricted stocks (Stock grant 
value) and the Black-Scholes value of options (Option grant value) granted in the current year are 
included to control for the effect of contemporaneous equity-based compensation. To account for the 
effect of prior exposure to company stock, we include the value of stock ownership (Stock ownership) and 
the intrinsic value of unexercised exercisable (Unexercised exercisable options) and unexercised 
unexercisable (Unexercised unexercisable options) stock options measured as of the prior fiscal year end. 
To control for the effect of current and lagged price changes on the value of stock holdings, we also 
include a product of stock ownership as of the prior year end and the stock price change in the prior year 
(Stock ownership change (year -2 to -1)) and a product of stock ownership as of the prior year end and the 
stock price change in the current year (Stock ownership change (year -1 to 0)). To capture the effect of 
risk and changes in risk on trading incentives, we include the idiosyncratic stock return volatility 
(Idiosyncratic volatility), the change in volatility as of the prior year end and the current year end (Change 
in idiosyncratic volatility (year -2 to -1) and Change in idiosyncratic volatility (year -2 to -1)).  
      Our third set of tests involves examining the short-run and long-run firm value of repurchases 
(Hypothesis 5). To capture the different value implications of repurchases out of different motivations, we 
form two portfolios of sample firms as follows. One portfolio is composed of firms with above-median 
excess stock returns (raw returns in excess of the contemporaneous market returns) and below-median 
pay duration. This portfolio should capture repurchases made after good performance by CEOs with short 
horizon incentives. The other portfolio contains the rest of sample firms.  
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      For both portfolios, we estimate abnormal returns around the repurchase announcements in a three-
day window (-1, 1) using the market model. The announcement dates are collected from SDC. Banyi, Dyl, 
and Kahle (2008) find that repurchase announcements provided in SDC are incomplete in that many firms’ 
announcements are left missed out. Therefore, in conducting our long-run studies, we follow Cheng, 
Harford, and Zhang (2010) to use the fiscal year end date of the repurchasing year as the event date. And 
to reduce the impact of the repurchase measure noise discussed in Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008), we 
require that for a repurchasing firm to be included in this long-run study, its repurchase expense be at 
least 1% of the firm’s market value of equity as of the prior fiscal year end. The results are not affected if 
we use the 0.1% cutoff. Following the prior literature (e.g., Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009), we employ two 
estimation approaches in computing the long-run abnormal stock returns: the Fama-French three-factor 
model combined with Ibbotson’s RATS (1975) methodology and the Fama-French calendar-time 
portfolio approach. We examine the abnormal stock returns for 12, 24, and 36 months for both portfolios.  
3.4. Summary statistics 
      Our final sample covers 884 firms and 1744 firm-years from 2005 to 2008. Panel A of Table 1 
presents a summary statistic for the main variables in our empirical analysis. Overall, share repurchases 
take place in about two-thirds of sample firm-years, indicating a period of extensive buybacks. On 
average, a firm spends $358 million, or about 3.2% of its lagged market value of equity, on the repurchase. 
The median of repurchase size is much smaller, which suggests that the distribution of repurchase size is 
rather skewed in the sample.  The average pay duration for the sample CEOs is around 1.87 years, which 
is longer than that reported in Gopalan et al. (2010), due to the fact that our sample focuses on firms with 
equity component in CEO compensation. The average (median) CEO stock ownership is 1.4% (0.3%), 
while the fraction of non-cash pay in total compensation exceeds 70%.  
      The average (median) market-to-book ratio is 3.35 (2.7), which is considerably high as our sample 
tilts towards large firms with substantial cash payout. On average, our sample firms beat the market by 
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4.8% in stock returns, but the median firm underperforms the market by 1.7%. The median firm has about 
8.5% and 14.3% of the book value of total assets in cash and cash flows, respectively. And it invests 
about 3.8% of the book value of total assets, and finance 15% of them using long-term debt. The median 
firm pays few dividends, although on average, sample firms pay out 14.7% of the net income in dividends. 
Our sample firms have on average 0.8% of the book value of total assets in non-operation income. 
Overall, the summary statistic suggests that our sample firms are profitable and experience a period of 
high valuation with substantial cross-sectional variations. We winsorize all continuous variables (except 
the pay duration) to reduce the impact of outliers. 
      In Panel B, we conduct a univariate test of how a firm’s repurchase decision relates to its prior excess 
return in firms with different pay durations. We compare the excess returns of repurchasing firms with 
below median duration with that of non-repurchasing firms with below median duration. We also perform 
the same comparison for firms with above median duration. We find that for firms with below median 
duration, repurchasing firms have even higher excess returns than non-repurchasing firms, although the 
difference is insignificant.  In contrast, for firms with above median duration, repurchasing firms 
experience significantly lower excess returns than non-repurchasing firms. This finding suggests that, 
unlike firms with longer pay duration, firms with shorter duration are less likely to time the market in 
their repurchase decision.   
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Tests of Hypothesis 1 
      In this section, we examine how CEOs’ horizon incentives may affect their repurchase decisions 
while controlling for factors that have been documented in the prior literature in explaining repurchase. 
Table 2 presents the consistent baseline results for both models: Logit (Panel A) and Tobit (Panel B). 
Overall, consistent with market timing, firms are more likely to repurchase after poor stock returns. Yet, 
the coefficients of the interaction term between pay duration and abnormal stock returns suggest that it 
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may only be the case for firms with relatively long CEO pay duration. Instead, CEOs with short pay 
duration are more likely to repurchase after good performance. To the extent that CEO stock ownership 
may proxy for long horizon incentive, we control for it in all of our multivariate regressions. It is 
statistically insignificant in explaining repurchases. In untabulated results, we also include an additional 
interaction term between CEO ownership and abnormal stock returns, and do not find it is statistically 
significant either.  
      Firms with shorter pay duration may need to buy back shares more frequently to offset the dilution 
from stock option granting and exercising, as suggested in the prior literature (e.g., Fenn and Liang, 2001; 
Kahle, 2002; and Weisbenner, 2004). To capture the effect of stock options on repurchases, we include a 
set of variables related with managerial stock options in Column (2) of both models. We find that 
coefficients on all of them are positive, but only those on unexercised exercisable options and exercised 
options are statistically significant in the Tobit model. It suggests that exercised or exercisable stock 
options during the sample period are significantly related with the repurchase magnitude but not the 
repurchase likelihood. Nevertheless, the main finding on pay duration and repurchase is robust after 
controlling for stock options. 
      To see if our pay duration measure has incremental explanatory power to the equity incentive in the 
compensation, we control for the non-cash pay proportion in the total compensation of the CEOs. Note 
that the pay duration variable will then capture the difference in horizons of two pays with the same 
proportion of equity pay. We find that our main finding of pay duration is virtually unaffected. The 
coefficients on the non-cash pay itself are positive but only significant in the Tobit model, a finding 
reminiscent of the results on stock options in CEO pay as shown above.  
      Results on most of the explanatory variables are consistent with those in the prior literature.  For 
instance, large firms and firms with more cash, better operating performance, and lower leverage are more 
likely to repurchase and repurchase more. Also, those repurchasing firms are less likely those that pay 
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large dividends or have large investments (capital expenditures), which suggest that repurchases during 
2005-2008 are not dominated by those large firms who are also big dividend payers. One noteworthy 
finding, which departs from the previous literature, is that firms do not seem to take share repurchase as 
such a payout mode to dissipate temporary cash flows any longer compared to the earlier time: 
coefficients on the temporary cash flow item (Non-operation income) are insignificant and coefficients on 
cash flow volatility (Volatility of ROA) become significantly negative. Rather, firms tend to also pay out 
permanent cash flows as well.    
      Table 3 presents test results of Hypothesis 1a. We find strong support for it. The coefficients of the 
triple interaction term are significantly negative. Further, we find that the coefficients of the interaction 
term, Duration * Excess return, are no longer significant with only one exception in the Tobit model with 
the bid-ask spread being the liquidity measure. It thus suggests that the above documented relationship 
between CEO horizon incentive and repurchase is mainly driven by firms with less liquid stocks. This 
evidence strengthens our main hypothesis that CEOs with short pay horizon have more incentives to 
repurchase after good performance in order to bolster stock prices higher at least in the short run. This is 
because the stock price impact of share repurchase should be greater with less liquid stocks. Note that 
other explanatory variables are also included in all the regressions, but we choose not to report them to 
conserve space.  
4.2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 
      We have shown that CEOs with short pay duration have more incentives to repurchase after good 
performance.  In this section, we test Hypothesis 2 to distinguish this managerial myopia hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2a) from an alternative managerial overconfidence hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) by examining 
repurchasing CEOs’ contemporaneous private trades. Results shown in Table 4 support the managerial 
myopia hypothesis. The significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term, Duration * Excess 
return, suggests that CEOs with higher pay duration typically buy more after good stock performance. 
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And as the significantly positive coefficient on the triple interaction term – Repurchase * Duration * 
Excess return – indicates,   their private purchases increase with the amount of share repurchases, if any, 
by their firms. In contrast, CEOs with shorter pay duration sell more if more repurchases are conducted 
after good performance, suggested by the coefficient on the above triple interaction term and the 
significantly negative coefficient on the interaction term, Repurchase * Excess return.  
      Overall, we show that it is unlikely that short-horizon CEOs do not have a clear estimation of (as the 
media suggested) or are overconfident with their firms’ valuation before deciding on buying back shares 
after good performance. In addition, we find that CEOs’ prior exposure to equity incentive (unexercised 
exercisable options) and contemporaneous equity compensation (current stock and option grants) as well 
as higher trading risk (higher idiosyncratic volatility compared with the previous year) also propel them to 
sell more of their own holdings. Our finding in support of the managerial myopia hypothesis holds even 
after controlling for these intuitive factors in explaining a CEO’s private trading incentive.  
4.3. Tests of Hypothesis 3 and 4 
      The above sections have suggested that short-termist CEOs may ignore their private signal about the 
firms’ valuation and repurchase shares at high prices. Next we investigate whether this myopia may be 
due to failure of corporate governance, and how market pressure may aggravate managerial myopia. 
      Table 5 show results of testing Hypothesis 3. We do not find any evidence in suggesting that this 
managerial myopia in cash payout is related to mis-governance. In both models, the coefficients on the 
triple interaction term, Duration * Excess return * Poor corporate governance, are insignificant across all 
three governance measures. Nonetheless, the coefficients on the interaction term, Duration * Excess 
return, remain significantly negative with similar economic magnitudes as in the baseline regressions, 
except when we use GIM-index as the governance measure. In sum, Hypothesis 3 is not supported 
empirically.  
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      Table 6 and Table 7 present results of the effect of external pressure. We find some weak evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 4. The estimated coefficients on the market pressure variables interacted with 
Duration * Excess return are statistically significant in the Tobit model but not in the Logit model. Short-
horizon CEOs tend to repurchase more after good performance if such repurchases can boost up reported 
EPS towards the analysts’ forecast consensus, and when there are more investors with short-term 
investment horizons in the investor base. The coefficients on the term Duration * Excess return remain 
significantly negative in all model specifications, indicating the robustness of our main findings.  
4.4. Tests of Hypothesis 5 
      This section presents the results of firm value implication for repurchasing firms in both the short run 
and the long run, reported in Table 8.  We find that the market responds positively to the repurchase 
announcements by the sample firms overall, with the mean (median) three-day CAR being 1.8% (1.47%). 
The magnitude is slightly lower compared to those found in the prior literature. Furthermore, we do not 
find a significant difference of market reactions to repurchase announcements between firms in the 
portfolio of high (above-median) excess returns and short (below-median) pay duration and all other firms.  
      In the long run, there is some evidence that firms in the “high return – short duration” portfolio are 
able to reap a significantly positive abnormal stock returns for the first 12 months following repurchases. 
However, this good performance seems reversed during the next two years, as the abnormal returns of this 
portfolio become insignificantly different from zero for holding periods of 24 and 36 months. Investors 
indeed incur a loss in return for the next 12 and 24 months. In comparison, the abnormal returns of the 
other portfolio are significantly positive and at greater magnitudes for holding periods of 12, 24, and 36 
months, and they appear to increase over time. The results for the second portfolio are reminiscent of the 
findings in earlier research.  
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      Overall, we show that repurchases after good performance by short-horizon CEOs may benefit short-
term investors, but not those in the long run. Other repurchases consistently create value beneficial to 
shareholders both in the short term but also in the long term.   
5. Robustness Tests: Endogeneity of Pay Duration and Repurchase 
      Note that our study is not to argue that it is always optimal for firms to tie their executive 
compensation to long-term firm performance. The optimal pay duration will likely depend on a firm’s 
specific circumstance, market friction, and their interaction. In practice, there’s a rich cross-sectional 
variation of the mixture of short-term and long-term pay. While there are horizon-induced costs (like what 
we document in this study), boards weigh the benefits of such a pay structure against the costs, and in 
equilibrium we observe that some firms adopt short pay horizon. For example, Bolton, Scheinkman, and 
Xiong (2006) suggest that in a speculative market where stock prices may deviate from fundamentals, the 
optimal compensation contract may put more weight on short-term stock price performance than on long-
term fundamental value.12 Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2010) conduct a systemic analysis on 
the trade-off between short-term and long-term pay. As such, endogeneity concern arises from the 
supposition that pay duration and repurchase decision may be co-determined. Short pay duration may 
make managers less likely to time the market in repurchasing shares. In turn, in selecting optimal pay 
duration, shareholders will account for the effect of repurchase on managerial wealth through the 
structure of compensation scheme.  
      To isolate causation, we estimate a simultaneous equation system based on Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) that models pay duration and repurchase decision as jointly endogenous. The first 
equation in our two-equation system is the baseline specification in testing Hypothesis 1 (Column (1) of 
Table 2).  The second equation is specified as follows: 
                                                           
12  See also, for instances, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) on the 
determinants of compensation contracts. 
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where the control variables include firm size (total assets), market-to-book ratio, R&D, bid-ask spread, 
corporate governance, and idiosyncratic volatility. We select the control variables based on Gopalan, 
Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2010). They find that optimal pay duration decreases in the extent of the 
mispricing of the firm’s stock and in the quality of corporate governance.  
      In Table 9, we report the results for both equations. In the equation explaining repurchase, the 
coefficient of the interaction term, Duration * Excess return, remains significantly negative in both cases 
when the dependent variable is either the repurchase dummy or the repurchase ratio. Thus, we confirm 
that, even after controlling for the effect of repurchase on pay duration, our main finding continues to 
hold that firms with short pay durations are more likely to repurchase and repurchase more after good 
stock performance. In the equation explaining duration, we find that repurchase decision affects pay 
duration positively. And the coefficients of other variables are consistent with those in Gopalan et al. 
(2010), except that the coefficient of GIM-index is not significant possibly because our sample is smaller 
than theirs. 
      To address the concern that both pay duration and repurchase decision may be driven by some time-
invariant omitted variable, we also run a firm fixed-effect regression based on Equation (2). In 
untabulated results (for brevity), we find that the main finding still holds.   
6. Conclusion 
      Amid the renewed interest in executive compensation-related horizons after the financial crisis in 
2007-2009, our study presents new empirical evidence that managerial preference and horizon incentives 
matter for corporate decisions and firm value. In contrast to the liquidity constraints faced by many firms 
at the onset of the crisis which are shown to have largely dampened corporate investment, we document a 
share buyback binge by many firms during 2005-2008. Those firms paid high prices for their shares then 
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and only found their shares prices later dropped significantly to a much lower level during the crisis.  
Using a new measure of managerial horizon incentive based on the duration of pay, we show that many of 
those expensive repurchases, even viewed ex ante, were made by managers with short horizons who used 
repurchases to bolster current stock prices. Unlike repurchases motivated to take advantage of stock 
undervaluation, repurchases after good performance by short-horizon managers benefited selling 
investors but not those loyal (non-selling) shareholders in the long run. It appears that this short-termism 
in large cash payout is not related to corporate governance. There is some evidence that market pressure 
from both analysts’ EPS expectation and short-term institutional investors’ preference for short-term 
performance may have aggravated managerial myopia.  
      We also find that managers behave in a strikingly different way in their private trades. When their 
firms repurchase shares after good stock performance, CEOs with long horizon incentives increase their 
private purchases with the magnitude of firm buybacks, but CEOs with short horizon do the opposite. It 
highlights the importance of aligning managerial incentives with the interest of those long-term 
shareholders. 
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Appendix 1: Empirical Variable Definitions 
• Accretive repurchase is the number of quarters in which repurchases inflate reported EPS towards the 
analysts’ forecast consensus, divided by four.  
• Assets (log) is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. 
• Board size is the number of directors on the board. 
• Cash is the ratio of cash plus liquid investments to lagged value of total assets. 
• CAPX is the ratio of capital expenditure to lagged value of total assets. 
• Change in idiosyncratic volatility (year -2 to -1) is the change of Idiosyncratic volatility from year -2 
to year -1.  
• Change in idiosyncratic volatility (year -1 to 0) is the change of Idiosyncratic volatility from year -1 to 
year 0. 
• Debt ratio is the ratio of long-term debt to lagged value of total assets. 
• Dividend is the ratio of dollar amount of dividends to lagged net income available to common 
shareholders. 
• Duration is the pay duration defined in (1). 
• Excess return is the annual stock return in excess of the contemporaneous value-weighted CRSP stock 
return. 
• Exercised options is the dollar of exercised options in a year. 
• Fraction of non-cash pay is the ratio of non-cash component of CEO pay (sum of restricted stock and 
stock option) to the CEO’s total compensation. 
• GIM-index is measured on the same principle as Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
• Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of residuals obtained from regressing the firm’s raw 
daily stock return on the contemporaneous value-weighted CRSP stock return in a year. 
• Illiquidity is a dummy variable which equals one if Spread is in its top tercile of the sample, or 
Turnover is in its bottom tercile of the sample. 
• MB is the market-to-book ratio.  
• Non-operating income is the ratio of non-operating income (Compustat item nopi) to lagged value of 
total assets.  
• Option grant value is the Black-Scholes value of stock options grant in the current year. 
• Overall institutional ownership is the ratio of total shares owned by institutional investors to the 
number of shares outstanding. 
29 
 
• Ownership of non-exe directors is the collective stock ownership by all non-executive directors on the 
board. 
• Poor governance is a dummy variable which equals one if GIM-index is in its top tercile of the sample, 
or Board size is in its top tercile of the sample, or Ownership of non-exe directors is in its bottom 
tercile of the sample. 
• R&D is the ratio of research and development to total assets.  
• Repurchase is the dollar amount of share repurchase, defined based on Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
• Repurchase dummy is a dummy variable which equals one if Repurchase ratio is no less than 0.1% 
and zero otherwise.  
• Repurchase ratio is the ratio of Repurchase to lagged market value of equity.  
• ROA is the return on assets, defined as the ratio of operation income before depreciation to lagged 
value of total assets. 
• Short-term institutions is the proportion of institutional investors with short-investment horizon. The 
institutional investor horizon is defined based on Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005). 
• Spread is the monthly average stock bid-ask spread in the past three years. 
• Stock grant value is the dollar value of restricted stocks granted in the current year.  
• Stock ownership is shares owned by the CEO divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
• Stock ownership change(year -2 to -1) is the product of the number of shares owned as of the year -1 
and the stock price change from year-end -2 to year-end -1.   
• Stock ownership change (year -1 to 0)) us the product of the number of shares owned as of the year -1 
and the stock price change from year-end -1 to year-end 0.  
• Turnover equals 1000 times the monthly average ratio of the trading volume to shares outstanding in 
the past three years. 
• Unexercised exercisable options is the intrinsic value of unexercised but exercisable stock options 
reported in ExecuComp. 
• Unexercised unexercisable options is the intrinsic value of unexercised and non-exercisable stock 
options reported in ExecuComp. 
• Volatility of ROA is the standard deviation of the annual ROA for the last five years.  
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Table 1   Summary Statistic 
Panel A of this table presents the summary statistic of the 884 sample S&P 1500 index firms (excluding 
financial/utility firms) from 2005 to 2008. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Panel B reports results of a 
univariate test of difference in prior-year excess returns between non-repurchase firms and repurchase firms. The 
sample is divided into two subsamples depending on whether a firm’s pay duration is above or below the sample 
median. The t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test are conducted to test the difference between means (t-stat) and 
between the distributions (z-stat) of excess returns. *** and ** denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the overall sample 
Variable Mean Median Std N 
Repurchase dummy 0.682 1 0.466 1744 
Repurchase ratio 0.032 0.018 0.04 1744 
Repurchase ($ MM) 358.4 39.45 952.8 1744 
Duration 1.866 1.891 0.692 1744 
Fraction of non-cash pay 0.713 0.757 0.189 1744 
Stock ownership 0.014 0.003 0.032 1744 
Excess return 0.048 -0.017 0.354 1744 
Assets (log) 7.672 7.549 1.526 1744 
Cash 0.148 0.085 0.158 1744 
MB 3.347 2.712 2.482 1744 
Debt ratio 0.164 0.15 0.14 1744 
ROA 0.155 0.143 0.073 1744 
CAPX 0.057 0.038 0.058 1744 
Non-operating income 0.008 0.006 0.01 1744 
Dividend 0.147 2E-04 0.295 1744 
Volatility of ROA 0.035 0.025 0.031 1744 
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.018 0.017 0.006 1744 
 
Panel B: Univariate test of difference in prior-year excess returns between non-
repurchase firms and repurchase firms   
 Low Pay Duration High Pay Duration 
 
Non-
repurchase Repurchase 
Difference 
t/z-stat 
Non-
repurchase Repurchase 
Difference 
t/z-stat 
Mean 0.035 0.040 -0.193 0.136 0.032 3.809*** 
Median -0.044 -0.009 -1.132 0.055 -0.027 2.437** 
N 333 539 222 650 
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Table 2  CEO Horizon Incentive and Decision to Repurchase: Baseline Analysis 
This table reports regression results of how CEO horizon incentive affects firm repurchase decisions. Panel A 
employs a Logit model, where the dependent variable is Repurchase dummy. Panel B employs a Tobit model where 
the dependent variable is Repurchase ratio. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Logit Model 
(1) (2) (3) 
Duration 0.094 0.066 0.040 
(0.358) (0.521) (0.762) 
Excess return -0.585*** -0.566*** -0.585*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Duration * Excess return -0.696*** -0.669** -0.694*** 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Stock ownership -1.840 -2.489 -1.634 
(0.431) (0.294) (0.485) 
Unexercised exercisable options 5.682 
(0.367) 
Unexercised unexercisable options 3.742 
(0.725) 
Exercised options 20.233 
(0.181) 
Fraction of non-cash pay 0.315 
(0.521) 
Assets (log) 0.392*** 0.439*** 0.381*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 1.681*** 1.631*** 1.649*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
MB 0.059* 0.060* 0.057 
(0.084) (0.088) (0.101) 
Debt ratio -2.388*** -2.506*** -2.396*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 7.559*** 7.678*** 7.573*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPX -5.786*** -5.735*** -5.753*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-operating income 2.858 2.092 2.610 
(0.718) (0.793) (0.741) 
Dividend -0.495** -0.498** -0.480** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.020) 
Volatility of ROA -4.940** -4.867** -5.007** 
(0.036) (0.042) (0.034) 
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Idiosyncratic volatility -72.153*** -71.213*** -72.265*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -1.597** -2.158** -1.706** 
(0.046) (0.019) (0.035) 
Obs. 1744 1698 1744 
R-square 0.176 0.179 0.176 
 
 
Panel B: Tobit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Duration 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.575) (0.986) (0.438) 
Excess return -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Duration * Excess return -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Stock ownership -0.035 -0.056 -0.018 
 (0.507) (0.302) (0.737) 
Unexercised exercisable options 0.261* 
 (0.087) 
Unexercised unexercisable options 0.301 
 (0.228) 
Exercised options 1.319*** 
 (0.001) 
Fraction of non-cash pay 0.025** 
 (0.038) 
Assets (log) 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MB 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.674) (0.723) (0.855) 
Debt ratio -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.040*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
ROA 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CAPX -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.130*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Non-operating income 0.019 -0.027 0.005 
 (0.907) (0.868) (0.976) 
Dividend -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility of ROA -0.161*** -0.158*** -0.164*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Idiosyncratic volatility -1.680*** -1.578*** -1.692*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.007 -0.039** -0.017 
 (0.689) (0.031) (0.322) 
Obs. 1744 1698 1744 
R-square 0.12 0.132 0.122 
 
 
 
 
Table 3  CEO Horizon Incentive and Decision to Repurchase: Effect of Stock Liquidity 
This table reports regression results of how the relationship between CEO horizon incentive and firm repurchase 
decisions varies with stock liquidity. In the Logit model, the dependent variable is Repurchase dummy. In the Tobit 
model, the dependent variable is Repurchase ratio. Also, two measures of stock liquidity are used: Spread and 
Turnover. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Other control variables in Table 2 are included here but not 
reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Model Logit Tobit 
Liquidity measure Spread Turnover Spread Turnover 
Duration 0.118 0.117 0.002 0.002 
(0.296) (0.319) (0.353) (0.544) 
Excess return -0.388** -0.536*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
(0.026) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) 
Duration * Excess return -0.367 -0.450 -0.010* -0.009 
(0.216) (0.120) (0.098) (0.130) 
Illiquidity dummy -0.388** -0.120 -0.011*** -0.010*** 
(0.042) (0.482) (0.001) (0.004) 
Duration * Illiquidity -0.109 -0.074 -0.007 -0.002 
(0.604) (0.725) (0.134) (0.546) 
Excess return * Illiquidity -0.436 0.057 -0.003 0.013 
(0.334) (0.911) (0.717) (0.175) 
Duration * Excess return * Illiquidity -1.431** -1.153* -0.029** -0.030*** 
(0.016) (0.089) (0.030) (0.008) 
Other controls YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 1744 1744 1744 1744 
R-square 0.181 0.176 0.126 0.126 
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Table 4  CEOs’ Private Trades When Firms Are Buying Back Shares 
This table reports the OLS regression result of how CEOs conduct their private trades when their firms are buying 
back shares. The dependent variable is Net CEO Purchase, defined as the dollar value of net open market purchases 
following Jenter (2005). It is calculated as the product of the net number of shares bought or sold during a year by 
the stock price at the end of the fiscal year. The number of shares bought or sold on the open market during a year is 
the annual change in stock holdings minus the number of shares acquired through option exercises and stock grants. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and p-values are reported 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Repurchase -0.002 
(0.130) 
Duration -0.266 
(0.813) 
Repurchase * Duration 0.002 
(0.279) 
Excess return -6.850** 
(0.024) 
Repurchase * Excess return -0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Duration * Excess return 10.878** 
(0.046) 
Repurchase * Duration * Excess return 0.035** 
(0.021) 
Stock grant value -1.158*** 
(0.004) 
Option grant value -1.091* 
(0.064) 
Unexercised exercisable options -0.229*** 
(0.000) 
Unexercised unexercisable options 0.389 
(0.109) 
Stock ownership change (year -1 to 0) -0.078 
(0.294) 
Stock ownership change (year -2 to -1) -0.024 
(0.671) 
Stock ownership -0.031 
(0.113) 
Idiosyncratic volatility -145.077 
(0.289) 
Change in idiosyncratic volatility (year -2 to -1) 62.230 
(0.630) 
Change in idiosyncratic volatility (year -1 to 0) 355.761 
(0.047)** 
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Assets (log) 0.067 
(0.932) 
MB -0.052 
(0.876) 
Obs. 1627 
R-square 0.155 
4
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Table 6  CEO Horizon Incentive and Decision to Repurchase: Effect of EPS Management 
This table reports regression results of how the relationship between CEO horizon incentive and firm repurchase 
decisions varies with the incentive to inflate reported EPS towards the analysts’ forecast consensus. In the Logit 
model, the dependent variable is Repurchase dummy. In the Tobit model, the dependent variable is Repurchase ratio. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Other control variables in Table 2 are included here but not reported. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Logit Tobit 
Duration 0.046 0.002 
(0.765) (0.353) 
Excess return -0.495 -0.013*** 
(0.200) (0.000) 
Duration * Excess return -0.996* -0.017*** 
(0.055) (0.003) 
Proportion of accretive repurchase quarters 14.658*** 0.116*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Duration * Accretive repurchase -2.819 -0.024 
(0.388) (0.210) 
Excess return *  Accretive repurchase -1.235 -0.009 
(0.898) (0.731) 
Duration * Excess return *  Accretive repurchase -11.603 -0.078** 
(0.369) (0.021) 
Other controls YES YES 
Obs. 1646 1646 
R-square 0.217 0.155 
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Table 7  CEO Horizon Incentive and Decision to Repurchase: Effect of Investor Horizon 
This table reports regression results of how the relationship between CEO horizon incentive and firm repurchase 
decisions varies with the pressure for short-run perform from investors with short-term investment horizon. In the 
Logit model, the dependent variable is Repurchase dummy. In the Tobit model, the dependent variable is 
Repurchase ratio. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. Other control variables in Table 2 are included here but 
not reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Logit Tobit 
Duration 0.113 0.002 
(0.286) (0.445) 
Excess return -0.471** -0.012*** 
(0.015) (0.002) 
Duration * Excess return -0.707** -0.019*** 
(0.015) (0.002) 
Proportion of short-term institutions -0.687 0.017 
(0.386) (0.359) 
Duration * Short-term institutions 1.336 0.055** 
(0.177) (0.021) 
Excess return *  Short-term institutions -0.039 -0.045 
(0.980) (0.137) 
Duration * Excess return *  Short-term institutions -1.943 -0.086** 
(0.211) (0.017) 
Overall institutional ownership -0.249 0.004 
(0.570) (0.658) 
Other controls YES YES 
Obs. 1741 1741 
R-square 0.176 0.124 
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Table 9   CEO Horizon Incentive and Decision to Repurchase: Simultaneous Equations 
This table reports GMM estimation results of two simultaneous equations of pay duration and repurchase decision. 
In Panel A, the dependent variables are Repurchase dummy and Duration. In Panel B, the dependent variables are 
Repurchase ratio and Duration. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. 
 Panel A Panel B 
 
Repurchase 
dummy 
Pay 
Duration 
Repurchase 
ratio 
Pay 
Duration 
Duration 0.170 -0.017 
 (0.527) (0.605) 
Excess return 6.220* 0.063 0.808** 0.047 
 (0.062) (0.177) (0.041) (0.291) 
Duration * Excess return -3.390* -0.440** 
 (0.057) (0.037) 
Stock ownership -0.605 -0.053 
 (0.332) (0.491) 
Assets (log) 0.048 0.172*** 0.008 0.185*** 
 (0.390) (0.000) (0.219) (0.000) 
Cash 0.178 0.052** 
 (0.395) (0.049) 
MB 0.005 0.015** 0.001 0.020*** 
 (0.564) (0.034) (0.358) (0.005) 
Debt ratio -0.436*** -0.029 
 (0.009) (0.171) 
ROA 1.336*** 0.069 
 (0.003) (0.237) 
CAPX -1.310** -0.096 
 (0.018) (0.146) 
Non-operating income 3.536 0.456 
 (0.260) (0.241) 
Dividend -0.130 -0.024** 
 (0.160) (0.040) 
Volatility of ROA -1.387 -0.174 
 (0.186) (0.168) 
Repurchase dummy / Repurchase ratio 0.353*** 4.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) 
Idiosyncratic volatility 4.569** 3.664* 
 (0.037) (0.087) 
R&D 1.623*** 1.737*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Spread 0.524 1.369* 
 (0.429) (0.051) 
GIM-index 0.008 0.006 
 (0.142) (0.238) 
Obs. 1521 1521 1521 1521 
 
